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Recent Developments

Cases
ADM Partnership v. Martin:

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held in ADM
Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. 84,
702 A.2d 730 (1997) that the
subjective belief of an employee
that her neglect to assume a risk
inherent to her described job
duties would result in negative
consequences does not create a
genuine dispute regarding the
doctrine of assumption of risk.
The court concluded that the
"voluntariness" factor, inherent in
the doctrine of assumption of risk,
could not be negated by an
employee who was instructed to
carry out the performance of work
duties,
regardless
of
the
employee's fear that refusal to do
so would result in the loss of her
position or adverse economic
repercussions for her employer.
On March 8, 1989, Keen
Tykenko Martin ("Martin"), a
Ideal
delivery
person
for
Reprographics,
Inc.,
was
instructed to deliver blueprints to a
ADM
property
owned
by
Partnership ("ADM").
Upon
arriving at her destination, Martin
observed that ice and snow
covered the majority of the parking
lot and walkways surrounding the
building. After observing footprints
had
indicating
that
others
traversed over the same ground,
Martin concluded that she, too,
could travel safely to and from the
business' entrance. As Martin
proceeded around her vehicle in
order to remove the blueprints
from the passenger side, she
slipped but avoided injury by
grabbing onto her automobile.
She then continued her task and
delivered the prints successfully.
However, upon leaving, Ms. Martin
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fell, severely injuring her lower
back.
The
Circuit
Court
for
Montgomery County granted
ADM's motion for judgment at the
conclusion of plaintiffs case,
finding
that
the
evidence
sufficiently established that Martin
had voluntarily assumed a risk of
injury when she chose to cross the
slippery sidewalk. The court of
special appeals reversed, stating
that Martin's belief that she would
have
encountered
negative
conseque~ces if she failed to fulfill
her job requirements presented a
factual issue as to whether her
actions were voluntary and,
therefore, was a question for jury
determination.
Certiorari was granted and the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
began its analysis by reviewing the
standard for the assumption of risk
doctrine in Maryland.
ADM
Partnership, 348 Md. at 90, 702
A.2d at 734. The court recognized
that assumption of risk requires
the defendant to prove that the
plaintiff: "(1) had knowledge of the

risk of danger; (2) appreciated that
risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted
the risk of danger." Id. at 91, 702
A.2d at 734 (citing Uscombe v.
Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619,
630, 495 A.2d 838 (1985».
Further, the court noted that
assumption of risk results in the
plaintiff relieving the defendant of
his duty of care. Id. (quoting
Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233,
243, 262 A.2d 549, 554 (1970».
Finally, the court applied an
objective test, stating that when a
reasonable person would have
clearly understood an obvious risk
presented by the individual
circumstances, the issue becomes
one of a matter of law. Id. at 91-2,
702 A.2d at 734 (citing Schroyer v.
McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 283-8, 592
A.2d 1119, 1123 (1991». The
court concluded, "'there are certain
risks which anyone of adult age
must be taken to appreciate: the
danger of slipping on ice, of falling I
through unguarded openings, of
lifting heavy objects. . . and
doubtless many others. Id. at 92,
702 A.2d at 734 (quoting Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts,
§68 at 488 (5th ed. 1984)}.
In continuing its discussion, the
court emphasized that the
rationale of the intermediate court
relied upon the determination that
an employee's job requirement to
complete
a
specified
task
necessarily controls the issue of
voluntarism; thus, Martin had been
deprived of chOOSing whether to
act or not to act through no fault of
her own. Id. at 95, 702 A.2d at
736. The court of appeals noted
"the intermediate appellate court
then proceeded to draw the
conclusion that '. . . one might
III
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reasonably infer that Martin, with
clear
and
reasonable
no
alternative, was compelled to use
the walkway in order to complete
the delivery for her employer.'" Id.
702 A.2d at 735 (quoting Martin v.
ADM Partnership, Inc.,
106
Md.App. 652, 665, 666 A.2d at 883
(1995». The Court of Appeals of
Maryland, however, evaluated the
case law presented by the parties
at trial as contrary to the decision
of the court of special appeals and
found the analysis of the lower
court flawed.
The court of appeals previously
held that where a plaintiff makes
an informed choice and is fully
aware of the dangerous conditions
of certain premises, the plaintiff is
barred from recovery based on the
doctrine of assumption of risk. Id.
(quoting Schroyer, 323 Md. at 28889, 592 A.2d at 1125-26). The
plaintiff in Schroyer was a guest at
a hotel where the front entrance to
the lodging had been cleared of ice
and snow. Id. at 97, 702 A.2d at
737.
Schroyer,
however,
voluntarily chose to park her
automobile in an area more
convenient to her hotel room that
had not been shoveled. Id. After
safely completing one trip from her
vehicle to her hotel room, she
slipped and fell during a second
attempt. Id. The court refuted the
intermediate court's application of
Schroyer to the instant case,
stating that no evidence existed in
the previous Martin decision to
indicate that plaintiff's employment
was adversely affected. Id. What
is more, the court of appeals
distinguished Schroyer further,
noting that due to plaintiffs
knowledge of the existing icy
condition of the sidewalk, she
voluntarily chose to encounter the
risk. Id. The Schroyer tribunal,
the court of appeals continued,
was not able to reach the
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voluntariness
issue
because
plaintiff was barred from recovery
based on the facts presented:
"[t]here simply was no evidence, in
that case, to suggest that the
plaintiff's
employment
was
adversely affected and, therefore,
we did not address that issue." Id.
at 98,702 A.2d at 737.
Moreover, the court of appeals
rejected
the
lower
court's
application of Burke v. Williams,
244 Md. 154, 223 A.2d 187
(1966». Id. The court of special
appeals attempted to apply Burke
to the case at bar to determine at
what point the performance of
employment
responsibilities
becomes a voluntary act. Id. In
Burke, the plaintiff, a deliveryman,
suffered injury when he slipped
and fell off two footboards, landing
in an excavation. Id. at 95, 702
A.2d at 736. Although he had
safely completed other trips at that
location prior to his accident, it was
argued by the plaintiff that due to
limited routes into the work area,
the nature of the employment, and
Burke's trepidation regarding a
loss of income if he failed to
deliver the sink tops, he did not
voluntarily assume the risk. Id. at
95-6,702 A.2d at 736-37 (quoting
Burke, 244 Md. at 158, 223 A.2d at
189). The Court of Appeals of
Maryland remarked that this
argument ultimately did not apply
to the Martin scenario because the
only holding in Burke was that
"there was no evidence to show
that plaintiff was not acting on his
own volition or free will, or that his
employment would have been in
jeopardy had he refused to use the
walkway to make the delivery." Id.
at 98,702 A.2d at 737-38.
Additionally, the court found
error in that the evidence proffered
at trial by plaintiff did not support a
conclusion that ADM placed Martin
in a position of having no choice

but to use the snow and icecovered walkway. Id. 702 A.2d at
738.
Also, neither Martin's
employer nor ADM ever insisted
that she use the sidewalk against
her will, despite her testimony that
she held a subjective belief that
she would be terminated had she
failed to do so. Id.
Lastly, the court was not
persuaded by plaintiffs argument
that ADM breached their tortbased duty to Ms. Martin. Id. at
100, 702 A.2d at 739. Martin
presented the reasoning that
where a defendant has a duty to a
plaintiff to make conditions of their
relationship safer than they
appear, coercion may emanate
from sources other than the
defendant, thereby negating the
application of the doctrine of
assumption of risk. Id. The court
concluded, nevertheless, that
Martin failed to establish that the
alleged breach of the duty owed
her may have been responsible for
the coercive element inflicted upon
her;
therefore, the necessary
factor of volition could not be
discarded when applying the
doctrine to the case at hand. Id.
Chief Judge Bell, writing for the
majority in ADM Partnership v.
Martin, reaffirmed the necessary
factors inherent to the application
of the doctrine of assumption of
risk. In finding error in the decision
of the court of special appeals, the
court managed to focus its opinion
upon the original issue of
"voluntariness," and held that an
employee's subjective belief that
failure to fulfill an employment
responsibility is not sufficient to
establish liability on the part of the
defendant. This analysis by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
negates any subjective aspect
regarding the application of the
doctrine of assumption of risk. In
emphasizing the test as an
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objective
one,
the
court
established the doctrine as a
matter of law, not of fact, and
suitable for judicial determination.
As a result, plaintiffs are precluded
from relying on their own emotional

pleas to establish a persuasive
argument regarding assumption of
risk and, therefore, from presenting
evidence that may have influenced
their decision making process.
Thus, determination of liability is

properly placed instead on an
impartial
participant
the
presiding judge - rather than in the
hands of the jury.
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